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Abstract. We consider distributed on-device learning with limited com-
munication and security requirements. We propose a new robust dis-
tributed optimization algorithm with efficient communication and attack
tolerance. The proposed algorithm has provable convergence and robust-
ness under non-IID settings. Empirical results show that the proposed
algorithm stabilizes the convergence and tolerates data poisoning on a
small number of workers.
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1 Introduction
Edge devices/IoT such as smart phones, wearable devices, sensors, and smart
homes are increasingly generating massive, diverse, and private data. In response,
there is a trend towards moving computation, including the training of machine-
learning models, from cloud/datacenters to edge devices [1,24]. Ideally, since
trained on massive representative data, the resulting models exhibit improved
generalization. In this paper, we consider distributed on-device machine learning.
The distributed system is a server-worker architecture. The workers are placed on
edge devices, which train the models on the private data. The servers are placed on
the cloud/datacenters which maintain a shared global model. Distributed settings
require addressing some novel engineering challenges, including the following:
– Limited, heterogeneous computation. Edge devices, including smart
phones, wearable devices, sensors, or vehicles typically have weaker com-
putational ability, compared to the workstations or datacenters used in typical
distributed machine learning. Thus, simpler models and stochastic training
are usually applied in practice. Furthermore, different devices have different
computation capabilities.
– Limited communication The connection to the central servers are not
guaranteed. Communication can be frequently unavailable, slow, or expensive
(in money or in the power of battery). Thus, frequent high-speed communication
is typically unaffordable.
– Decentralized, non-IID training data. Privacy needs and legal require-
ments (e.g., US HIPAA laws [12] in a smart hospital, or Europe’s GDPR
law [8]) may necessitate that training be performed on-premises using IoT
devices and edge machines, and that data and models must not be deposited in
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the cloud or cloudlets. In more general cases, the users simply dislike sharing
their on-device data which potentially reveals private information. As a result,
the data distribution on different devices are neither mixed nor IID i.e. unlike
standard settings, device data are non-identically distributed samples from
the population. This is particularly true when each device is controlled by
a specific user whose behavior is supposed to be unique. Furthermore, the
sampled data on nearby devices are potentially non-independent, since such
devices can be shared by the same user or family. For example, the data of
a step counter from a wearable fitness tracker and a smart phone owned by
the same user can have different distributions of motion data with mutual
dependency. Imagine that the fitness tracker is only used when the user is
running, and the smart phone is only used when the user is walking, which
results in different distributions. On the other hand, the complementation
yields dependency.
– Untrusted workers and data poisoning. The servers have limited control
over the users’ behavior. To protect the privacy, the users are in general
anonymous to the servers. Although it is possible to verity the identity of
workers/devices [25], nefarious users can feed poisoned data with abnormal
behaviors without backdooring OS. As a result, some workers may push models
learned on poisoned data to the servers.
To overcome the challenges above, we introduce Secure Local Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SLSGD), which reduces the communication overhead with
local updates, and secures the global model against nefarious users and poisoned
data. We summarize the key properties of SLSGD below:
– Local SGD. SGD is widely used for training models with lower computation
overhead. To reduce communication overhead, we use SGD with local updates.
The workers do not synchronize with the server after each local gradient descent
step. After several local iterations, the workers push the updated model to the
servers, which is different from the traditional distributed synchronous SGD
where gradients are pushed in each local gradient descent step. To further
reduce the communication overhead, the training tasks are activated on a
random subset of workers in each global epoch.
– Secure aggregation. In each global epoch, the servers send the latest global
model to the activated workers, and aggregate the updated local models. In
such procedure, there are two types of threats: i) poisoned models pushed from
comprised devices, occupied or hacked by nefarious users; ii) accumulative
error, variance, or models over-fitted on the local dataset, caused by infrequent
synchronization of local SGD. To secure the global model against these two
threats, we use robust aggregation which tolerates abnormal models, and mov-
ing average which mitigates the errors caused by infrequent synchronization.
To our knowledge, there is limited work on local SGD with theoretical
guarantees [29,26]. The existing convergence guarantees are based on the strong
assumption of IID training data or homogeneous local iterations, which we have
argued is inappropriate for distributed learning on edge devices.
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We propose SLSGD, which is a variant of local SGD with provable convergence
under non-IID and heterogeneous settings, and tolerance to nefarious users. In
summary, the main contributions are listed as follows:
– We show that SLSGD theoretically converges to global optimums for strongly
convex functions, non-strongly convex functions, and a restricted family of non-
convex functions, under non-IID settings. Furthermore, more local iterations
accelerate the convergence.
– We show that SLSGD tolerates a small number of workers training on poisoned
data. As far as we know, this paper is the first to investigate the robustness of
local SGD.
– We show empirically that the proposed algorithm stabilizes the convergence,
and protects the global model from data poisoning.
2 Related Work
Our algorithm is based on local SGD introduced in [29,26]. The major differences
are:
1. We assume non-IID training data and heterogeneous local iterations among
the workers. In previous work, local SGD and its convergence analysis required
IID training data, or same number of local iterations within each global
epoch (or both). However, these assumptions are unreasonable for edge
computing, due to privacy preservation and heterogeneous computation
capability.
2. Instead of using the averaged model to overwrite the current global model
on the server, we take robust aggregation, and use a moving average to
update the current model. These techniques not only secure the global model
against data poisoning, but also mitigate the error caused by infrequent
synchronization of local SGD.
The limited communication power of edge devices also motivates federated
learning [16,17,22], whose algorithm is similar to local SGD, and scenario is
similar to our non-IID and heterogeneous settings. Unfortuntaely, federated
learning lacks provable convergence guarantees. Furthermore, the issues of data
poisoning have not been addressed in previous work. To the best of our knowledge,
our proposed work is the first that considers both convergence and robustness,
theoretically and practically, on non-IID training data.
Similar to the traditional distributed machine learning, we use the server-
worker architecture, which is similar to the Parameter Server (PS) architecture.
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with PS architecture, is widely used in typical
distributed machine learning [19,13,20]. Compared to the traditional distributed
learning on PS , SLSGD has much less synchronization. Furthermore, in SLSGD,
the workers push trained models instead of gradients to the servers.
Approaches based on robust statistics are often used to address security
issues in the PS architecture [28,27]. This enables procedures which tolerate
4 Cong Xie, Sanmi Koyejo, and Indranil Gupta
multiple types of attacks and system failures. However, the existing methods
and theoretical analysis do not consider local training on non-IID data. So far,
the convergence guarantees are based on robust gradient aggregation. In this
paper, we provide convergence guarantees for robust model aggregation. Note
that gradients and models (parameters) have different properties. For example,
the gradients converge to 0 for unconstrained problems, while the models do
not have such property. On the other hand, recent work has considered attacks
targeting federated learning [3,9,4], but do not propose defense techniques with
provable convergence.
There is growing literature on the practical applications of edge and fog
computing [10,14] in various scenarios such as smart home or sensor networks.
More and more big-data applications are moving from the cloud to the edge,
including for machine-learning tasks [5,21,30]. Although computational power is
growing, edge devices are still much weaker than the workstations and datacenters
used in typical distributed machine learning e.g. due to the limited computation
and communication capacity, and limited power of batteries. To this end, there
are machine-learning frameworks with simple architectures such as MobileNet [15]
which are designed for learning with weak devices.
3 Problem Formulation
Consider distributed learning with n devices. On each device, there is a worker
process that trains the model on local data. The overall goal is to train a global
model x ∈ Rd using data from all the devices.
To do so, we consider the following optimization problem:
min
x∈Rd
F (x),
where F (x) = 1n
∑
i∈[n] Ezi∼Dif(x; zi), for ∀i ∈ [n], zi is sampled from the local
data Di on the ith device.
3.1 Non-IID Local Datasets
Note that different devices have different local datasets, i.e., Di 6= Dj ,∀i 6= j.
Thus, samples drawn from different devices have different expectations, which
means that Ezi∼Dif(x; zi) 6= Ezj∼Djf(x; zj),∀i 6= j. Further, since different
devices can be possessed by the same user or the same group of users (e.g.,
families), samples drawn from different devices can be potentially dependent on
each other.
3.2 Data Poisoning
The users are anonymous to the servers. Furthermore, it is impossible for the
servers to verify the benignity of the on-device training data. Thus, the servers
can not trust the edge devices. A small number of devices may be susceptible to
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Table 1. Notations and Terminologies
Notation/Term Description
n Number of devices
k Number of simutaneously updating devices
T Number of communication epochs
[n] Set of integers {1, . . . , n}
St Randomly selected devices in the t
th epoch
b Parameter of trimmed mean
Hmin Minimal number of local iterations
Hit Number of local iterations in the t
th epoch
on the ith device
xt Initial model in the t
th epoch
xit,h Model updated in the t
th epoch, hth local iteration, on the ith device
Di Dataset on the ith device
zit,h Data (minibatch) sampled in the t
th epoch,
hth local iteration, on the ith device
γ Learning rate
α Weight of moving average
‖ · ‖ All the norms in this paper are l2-norms
Device Where the training data are placed
Worker One worker on each device, process that trains the model
User Agent that produces data on the devices, and/or controls the devices
Nefarious user Special user that produces poisoned data or has abnormal behaviors
data poisoned by abnormal user behaviors or in the worst case, are controlled by
users or agents who intend to directly upload harmful models to the servers.
In this paper, we consider a generalized threat model, where the workers
can push arbitrarily bad models to the servers. The bad models can cause
divergence of training. Beyond more benign issues such as hardware, software or
communication failures, there are multiple ways for nefarious users to manipulate
the uploaded models e.g. data poisoning [2]. In worst case, nefarious users can
even directly hack the devices and replace the correct models with arbitrary
values. We provide a more formal definition of the threat model in Section 4.1.
4 Methodology
In this paper, we propose SLSGD: SGD with communication efficient local
updates and secure model aggregation. A single execution of SLSGD is composed
of T communication epochs. At the beginning of each epoch, a randomly selected
group of devices St pull the latest global model from the central server. Then,
the same group of devices locally update the model without communication with
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the central server. At the end of each epoch, the central server aggregates the
updated models and then updates the global model.
In the tth epoch, on the ith device, we locally solve the following optimization
problem using SGD for Hit iterations:
min
x∈Rd
Ezi∼Dif(x; zi).
Then, the server collects the resulting local models xi
t,Hit
, and aggregates them
using Aggr
(
{xi
t,Hit
: i ∈ St}
)
. Finally, we update the model with a moving average
over the current model and the aggregated local models.
The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. xit,h is the model parameter
updated in hth local iteration of the tth epoch, on the ith device. zit,h is the
data randomly drawn in hth local iteration of the tth epoch, on the ith device.
Hit is the number of local iterations in the t
th epoch, on the ith device. γ is
the learning rate and T is the total number of epochs. Note that if we take
Option I (or Option II with b = 0) with α = 1, the algorithm is the same as the
federated learning algorithm FedAvg [22]. Furthermore, if we take homogeneous
local iterations Hit = H,∀i, Option I with α = 1 is the same as local SGD [26].
Thus, FedAvg and local SGD are both special cases of SLSGD.
Algorithm 1 SLSGD
1: Input: k ∈ [n], b
2: Initialize x0
3: for all epoch t ∈ [T ] do
4: Randomly select a group of k workers, denoted as St ⊆ [n]
5: for all i ∈ St in parallel do
6: Receive the latest global model xt−1 from the server
7: xit,0 ← xt−1
8: for all local iteration h ∈ [Hit ] do
9: Randomly sample zit,h
10: xit,h ← xit,h−1 − γ∇f(xit,h−1; zit,h)
11: end for
12: Push xi
t,Hit
to the server
13: end for
14: Aggregate: x′t ←
Option I:
1
k
∑
i∈St x
i
t,Hit
Option II: Trmeanb
({
xi
t,Hit
: i ∈ St
})
15: Update the global model: xt ← (1− α)xt−1 + αx′t
16: end for
4.1 Threat Model and Defense Technique
First, we formally define the threat model.
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Definition 1. (Threat Model) In Line 12 of Algorithm 1, instead of the correct
xi
t,Hit
, a worker, training on poisoned data or controlled by an abnormal/nefarious
user, may push arbitrary values to the server.
Remark 1. Note that the users/workers are anonymous to the servers, and the
nefarious users can sometimes pretend to be well-behaved to fool the servers.
Hence, it is impossible to surely identify the workers training on poisoned data,
according to their historical behavior.
In Algorithm 1, Option II uses the trimmed mean as a robust aggregation
which tolerates the proposed threat model. To define the trimmed mean, we first
define the order statistics.
Definition 2. (Order Statistics) By sorting the scalar sequence {ui : i ∈ [k], ui ∈
R}, we get u1:k ≤ u2:k ≤ . . . ≤ uk:k, where ui:k is the ith smallest element in
{ui : i ∈ [k]}.
Then, we define the trimmed mean.
Definition 3. (Trimmed Mean) For b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , dk/2e − 1}, the b-trimmed
mean of the set of scalars {ui : i ∈ [k]} is defined as follows:
Trmeanb({ui : i ∈ [k]}) = 1
k − 2b
k−b∑
i=b+1
ui:k,
where ui:k is the ith smallest element in {ui : i ∈ [i]} defined in Definition 2.
The high-dimensional version (ui ∈ Rd) of Trmeanb(·) simply applies the trimmed
mean in a coordinate-wise manner.
Note that the trimmed mean (Option II) is equivalent to the standard mean
(Option I) if we take b = 0.
Remark 2. Algorithm 1 provides two levels of defense: robust aggregation (Line
14) and moving average (Line 15). The robust aggregation tries to filter out the
models trained on poisoned data. The moving average mitigates not only the
extra variance/error caused by robust aggregation and data poisoning, but also
the accumulative error caused by infrequent synchronization of local updates.
Remark 3. We can also replace the coordinate-wise trimmed mean with other
robust statistics such as geometric median [7]. We choose coordinate-wise medi-
an/trimmed mean in this paper because unlike geometric median, trimmed mean
has a computationally efficient closed-form solution.
5 Convergence Analysis
In this section, we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1 with non-IID data,
for a restricted family of non-convex functions. Furthermore, we show that the
proposed algorithm tolerates the threat model introduced in Definition 1. We
start with the assumptions required by the convergence guarantees.
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5.1 Assumptions
For convenience, we denote F i(x) = Ezi∼Dif(x; zi).
Assumption 1. (Existence of Global Optimum) We assume that there exists
at least one (potentially non-unique) global minimum of the loss function F (x),
denoted by x∗.
Assumption 2. (Bounded Taylor’s Approximation) We assume that for ∀x, z,
f(x; z) has L-smoothness and µ-lower-bounded Taylor’s approximation:
〈∇f(x; z), y − x〉+ µ
2
‖y − x‖2 ≤ f(y; z)− f(x; z)
≤ 〈∇f(x; z), y − x〉+ L
2
‖y − x‖2,
where µ ≤ L, and L > 0.
Note that Assumption 2 covers the case of non-convexity by taking µ < 0,
non-strong convexity by taking µ = 0, and strong convexity by taking µ > 0.
Assumption 3. (Bounded Gradient) We assume that for ∀x ∈ Rd, i ∈ [n], and
∀z ∼ Di, we have ‖∇f(x; z)‖2 ≤ V1.
Based on the assumptions above, we have the following convergence guarantees.
All the detailed proofs can be found in the appendix.
5.2 Convergence without Data Poisoning
First, we analyze the convergence of Algorithm 1 with Option I, where there are
no poisoned workers.
Theorem 1. We take γ ≤ min ( 1L , 2). After T epochs, Algorithm 1 with Option
I converges to a global optimum:
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)] ≤
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T]
O
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
,
where V2 = maxt∈{0,T−1},h∈{0,Hit−1},i∈[n] ‖xit,h − x∗‖2.
Remark 4. When α → 1, (1− α+ α(1− γ2 )Hmin)T → (1 − γ2 )THmin , which
results in nearly linear convergence to the global optimum, with error O(V1 +V2).
When α→ 0, the error is nearly reduced 0, but the convergence will slow down.
We can tune α to trade-off between the convergence rate and the error. In practice,
we can take diminishing α: αt ∝ 1t2 , where αt is the α in the tth global epoch.
Furthermore, taking αT =
1
T 2 , limT→+∞
[
1− (1− αT + αT (1− γ2 )Hmin)T ] = 0.
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5.3 Convergence with Data Poisoning
Under the threat model defined in Definition 1, in worst case, Algorithm 1 with
Option I and α = 1 (local SGD) suffers from unbounded error.
Proposition 1. (Informal) Algorithm 1 with Option I and α = 1 can not tolerate
the threat model defined in Definition 1.
Proof. (Sketch) Without loss of generality, assume that in a specific epoch
t, among all the k workers, the last q1 of them are poisoned. For the poi-
soned workers, instead of pushing the correct value xi
t,Hit
to the server, they
push −k−q1q1 xit,Hit + c, where c is an arbitrary constant. For convenience, we
assume IID (required by local SGD, but not our algorithm) local datasets for
all the workers. Thus, the expectation of the aggregated global model becomes
1
k
{
(k − q1)E
[
xi
t,Hit
]
+ q1E
[
−k−q1q1 xit,Hit + c
]}
= q1k c, which means that in ex-
pectation, the aggregated global model can be manipulated to take arbitrary
values, which results in unbounded error.
In the following theorems, we show that using Algorithm 1 with Option II, the
error can be upper bounded.
Theorem 2. Assume that additional to the n normal workers, there are q
workers training on poisoned data, where q  n, and 2q ≤ 2b < k. We take
γ ≤ min ( 1L , 2). After T epochs, Algorithm 1 with Option II converges to a global
optimum:
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)] ≤
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T]
[O(V1) +O(βV2)] ,
where V2 = maxt∈{0,T−1},h∈{0,Hit−1},i∈[n] ‖xit,h−x∗‖2, β = 1+ 1k−q− 1n+
k(k+b)
(k−b−q)2 .
Remark 5. Note that the additional error caused by the q poisoned workers and
b-trimmed mean is controlled by the factor k(k+b)(k−b−q)2 , which decreases when q
and b decreases, or k increases.
6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithm by testing its convergence
and robustness. Note that zoomed figures of the empirical results can be found
in the appendix.
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6.1 Datasets and Evaluation Metrics
We conduct experiments on the benchmark CIFAR-10 image classification
dataset [18], which is composed of 50k images for training and 10k images
for testing. Each image is resized and cropped to the shape of (24, 24, 3). We
use a convolutional neural network (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed
by 1 fully connected layer. We use a simple network architecture, so that it can
be easily handled by edge devices. The detailed network architecture can be
found in our submitted source code (will also be released upon publication). The
experiments are conducted on CPU devices. We implement SLSGD using the
MXNET [6] framework.
We also conduct experiments of LSTM-based language models on WikiText-2
dataset [23]. The model architecture was taken from the MXNET and Gluon-NLP
tutorial [11]. The results can be found in the appendix.
In each experiment, the training set is partitioned onto n = 100 devices. We
test the preformance of SLSGD on both balanced and unbalanced partitions:
– Balanced Partition. Each of the n = 100 partitions has 500 images.
– Unbalanced Partition. To make the setting more realistic, we partition
the training set into unbalanced sizes. The sizes of the 100 partitions are
104, 112, . . . , 896 (an arithmetic sequence with step 8, starting with 104).
Furthermore, to enlarge the variance, we make sure that in each partition,
there are at most 5 different labels out of all the 10 labels. Note that some
partitions only have one label.
In each epoch, k = 10 devices are randomly selected to launch local updates,
with the minibatch size of 50. We repeat each experiment 10 times and take the
average. We use top-1 accuracy on the testing set, and cross entropy loss function
on the training set as the evaluation metrics.
The baseline algorithm is FedAvg introduced by [22], which is a special case
of our proposed Algorithm 1 with Option I and α = 1. To make the comparison
clearer, we refer to FedAvg as “SLSGD, α = 1, b = 0”.
We test SLSGD with different hyperparameters γ, α, and b (definitions can
be found in Table 1).
6.2 SLSGD without Attack
We first test the performance of SLSGD on the training data with balanced
partition, without data poisoning. The result is shown in Fig. 1. When there are
no poisoned workers, using trimmed mean results in extra variance. Although
larger b and smaller α makes the convergence slower, the gap is tiny. In general,
SLSGD is insensitive to hyperparameters.
Then, we test the performance with unbalanced partition, without data poi-
soning. The result is shown in Fig. 2. Note that the convergence with unbalanced
partition is generally slower compared to balanced partition due to the larger
variance. Using appropriate α (α = 0.8) can mitigate such extra variance.
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Fig. 1. Convergence on training data with balanced partition, without attack. Each
epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend “SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2”
means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and Trmean2 for aggregation, and the
initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th epoch. SLSGD with α = 1 and
b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays
at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ and b are the same.
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Fig. 2. Convergence on training data with unbalanced partition, without attack. Each
epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend “SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2”
means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and Trmean2 for aggregation, and the
initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th epoch. SLSGD with α = 1 and
b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays
at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ and b are the same.
6.3 SLSGD under Data Poisoning Attack
To test the tolerance to poisoned workers, we simulate data poisoning which
“flips” the labels of the local training data. The poisoned data have “flipped”
labels, i.e., each label ∈ {0, . . . , 9} in the local training data will be replaced by
(9 − label). The experiment is set up so that in each epoch, in all the k = 10
randomly selected workers, q workers are compromised and subjected to data
poisoning. The results are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. We use FedAvg/SLSGD
without data poisoning (Option I) as the ideal benchmark. As expected, SLSGD
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Fig. 3. Convergence on training data with balanced partition, with “label-flipping”
attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q ∈ {2, 4} of the k = 10 selected workers
are poisoned. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend “SLSGD,
γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and Trmean2
for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th epoch.
SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix the random seeds.
Thus, before α decays at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ and b are the same.
without trimmed mean can not tolerate data poisoning, which causes catastrophic
failure. SLSGD with Option II tolerates the poisoned worker, though converges
slower compared to SLSGD without data poisoning. Furthermore, larger b and
smaller α improves the robustness and stabilizes the convergence.
Note that taking q = 4 in every epoch pushes to the limit of SLSGD since
the algorithm requires 2q < k. In practice, if there are totally q = 4 poisoned
workers in the entire n = 100 workers, there is no guarantee that the poisoned
workers will always be activated in each epoch. Poisoning 40% of the sampled
data in each epoch incurs huge noise, while SLSGD can still prevent the global
model from divergence.
In Fig. 5, we show how α and b affect the convergence when data poisoning
and unbalanced partition cause extra error and variance. In such scenario, larger
b and smaller α makes SLSGD more robust and converge faster.
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Fig. 4. Convergence on training data with unbalanced partition, with “label-flipping”
attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q of the k = 10 selected workers are poisoned.
Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend “SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α =
0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and Trmean2 for aggregation,
and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th epoch. SLSGD with α = 1
and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α
decays at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ and b are the same.
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Fig. 5. Number of global epochs to reach training loss value 0.5, with unbalanced
partition and q = 2 poisoned workers. γ = 0.1. α and b varies. “α” on the x-axis is the
initial value of α, which does not decay during training.
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Fig. 6. Number of global epochs to reach training loss value 0.003, with balanced
partition, without poisoned workers. γ = 0.1. α and number of local iterations varies.
“pass=3” means each epoch is 3 full passes of the local datasets on the selected workers.
“α” on the x-axis is the initial value of α, which does not decay during training.
6.4 Acceleration by Local Updates
According to our theoretical analysis, more local updates in each epoch accelerate
the convergence. We test this theory in Fig. 6 with balanced partition, without
data poisoning. In the legend, “pass=3” means each epoch is 3 full passes of the
local datasets (H = 3 × 500/50 = 30 local iterations) on the selected workers.
We show that with more local iterations, SLSGD converges faster.
6.5 Discussion
The hyperparameters of SLSGD affects the convergence differently in different
scenarios:
– Balanced partition, no attacks. In this case, the overall variance is relatively
small. Thus, it is not necessary to use smaller α to mitigate the variance. The
extra variance caused by trimmed mean slows down the convergence. Since
the variance does not dominate, smaller α and larger b potentially slow down
the convergence, but the gap is tiny.
– Unbalanced partition, no attacks. In this case, the overall variance is larger
than the balanced case. Note that not only the size of local datasets, but
also the label distribution are unbalanced among the devices. Some partitions
only contains one label, which enlarges the accumulative error caused by
infrequent synchronization and overfitting the local training data. Thus, using
appropriate α can mitigate the variance. However, it is not necessary to use
the trimmed mean, since the variance caused by unbalanced partition is not
too bad compared to data poisoning.
– Balanced partition, under attacks. In this case, the error caused by poisoned
workers dominates. We must use trimmed mean to prevent divergence. Larger
b improves the robustness and convergence. Furthermore, using smaller α also
mitigates the error and improves the convergence.
– Unbalanced partition, under attacks. In this case, the error caused by poisoned
workers still dominates. In general, the usage of hyperparameters is similar
to the case of balanced partition under attacks. However, the unbalanced
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partition makes it more difficult to distinguish poisoned workers from normal
workers. As a result, the convergence gets much slower. Smaller α obtain more
improvement and better stabilization.
In general, there is a trade-off between convergence rate and variance/error
reduction. In the ideal case, if the variance is very small, SLSGD with α = 1 and
b = 0, i.e., FedAvg, has fastest convergence. Using other hyperparameters slightly
slows down the convergence, but the gap is tiny. When variance gets larger, users
can try smaller α. When the variance/error gets catastrophically large, the users
can use the trimmed mean to prevent divergence.
7 Conclusion
We propose a novel distributed optimization algorithm on non-IID training
data, which has limited communication and tolerates poisoned workers. The
algorithm has provable convergence. Our empirical results show good performance
in practice. In future work, we are going to analyze our algorithm on other threat
models, such as hardware or software failures.
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Appendix
8 Additional Experiments
8.1 CNN on CIFAR-10
We conduct experiments on the benchmark CIFAR-10 image classification
dataset [18], which is composed of 50k images for training and 10k images
for testing. Each image is resized and cropped to the shape of (24, 24, 3). We
use convolutional neural network (CNN) with 4 convolutional layers followed
by 1 fully connected layer. We use a simple network architecture, so that it can
be easily handled by edge devices. The detailed network architecture can be
found in our submitted source code (will also be released upon publication). The
experiments are conducted on CPU devices. We implement SLSGD using the
MXNET [6] framework. The results are shown in Fig. 7, 8, 9, and 10.
8.2 LSTM on WikiText-2
We conduct experiments on WikiText-2 dataset [23]. We use LSTM-based lan-
guage model. The model architecture was taken from the MXNET and Gluon-NLP
tutorial [11]. The detailed network architecture can be found in our submitted
source code (will also be released upon publication). The experiments are con-
ducted on CPU devices. We implement SLSGD using the MXNET [6] framework.
Similar to the CNN experiments, the dataset is partitioned onto 100 devices.
In each global epoch, 10 devices are activated for training. The results are shown
in Fig. 11, 12, and 13. For the poisoned workers, the labels of the local training
data are randomly permuted.
In general, we get similar results as CNN on CIFAR-10.
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Fig. 7. CNN experiment on CIFAR-10. Convergence on training data with unbalanced
partition, without attack. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend
“SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and
Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th
epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix
the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ
and b are the same.
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Fig. 8. CNN experiment on CIFAR-10. Convergence on training data with unbalanced
partition, without attack. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data. Legend
“SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning rate 0.1 and
Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 400th
epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix
the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 400th epoch, results with the same γ
and b are the same.
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Fig. 9. CNN experiment on CIFAR-10. Convergence on training data with balanced
partition, with “label-flipping” attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q ∈ {2, 4} of
the k = 10 selected workers are poisoned. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training
data. Legend “SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning
rate 0.1 and Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8
at the 400th epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg.
Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 400th epoch, results
with the same γ and b are the same.
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Fig. 10. CNN experiment on CIFAR-10. Convergence on training data with unbalanced
partition, with “label-flipping” attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q of the k = 10
selected workers are poisoned. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data.
Legend “SLSGD, γ = 0.1, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes the learning rate
0.1 and Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at
the 400th epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note
that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 400th epoch, results with
the same γ and b are the same.
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Fig. 11. LSTM experiment on WikiText-2. Convergence on training data with balanced
partition, without attack. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training data. We
take learning rate γ = 20. Legend “SLSGD, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that SLSGD takes
Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8 at the 600th
epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg. Note that we fix
the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 600th epoch, results with the same γ
and b are the same.
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Fig. 12. LSTM experiment on WikiText-2. Convergence on training data with balanced
partition, under attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q = 2 of the k = 10 selected
workers are training on poisoned data. Each epoch is a full pass of the local training
data. We take learning rate γ = 20. Legend “SLSGD, α = 0.8, b = 2” means that
SLSGD takes Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the factor of 0.8
at the 600th epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline FedAvg.
Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 600th epoch, results
with the same γ and b are the same.
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Fig. 13. (Zoomed) LSTM experiment on WikiText-2. Convergence on training data
with balanced partition, under attack. In each epoch, we guarantee that q = 2 of the
k = 10 selected workers are training on poisoned data. Each epoch is a full pass of the
local training data. We take learning rate γ = 20. Legend “SLSGD, α = 0.8, b = 2”
means that SLSGD takes Trmean2 for aggregation, and the initial α = 1 decays by the
factor of 0.8 at the 600th epoch. Note that SLSGD with α = 1 and b = 0 is the baseline
FedAvg. Note that we fix the random seeds. Thus, before α decays at the 600th epoch,
results with the same γ and b are the same.
9 Proofs
Theorem 1. We take γ ≤ min ( 1L , 2). After T epochs, Algorithm 1 with Option
I converges to a global optimum:
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)] ≤
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T]
O
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
,
where V2 = maxt∈{0,T−1},h∈{0,Hit−1},i∈[n] ‖xit,h − x∗‖2.
Proof. For convenience, we ignore the random sample z ∼ Di in our notations.
Thus, f i(xit,h) represents f(x
i
t,h; z
i
t,h), where z
i
t,h ∼ Di. Furthermore, we define
F i(x) = Ez∼Dif(x; z).
Thus, Line 10 in Algorithm 1 can be rewritten into
xit,h = x
i
t,h−1 − γ∇f it (xit,h−1).
Using L-smoothness of F (x), we have
F (xit,h)
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≤ F (xit,h−1)− γ
〈∇F (xit,h−1,∇f i(xit,h−1)〉+ Lγ22 ∥∥∇f i(xit,h−1)∥∥2
≤ F (xit,h−1)− γ
〈∇F (xit,h−1,∇f i(xit,h−1)〉+ γ2 ∥∥∇f i(xit,h−1)∥∥2
≤ F (xit,h−1)−
γ
2
∥∥∇F (xit,h−1)∥∥2 + γ2 ∥∥∇F (xit,h−1)− f i(xit,h−1)∥∥2 .
It is easy to check that ∃ρ ≥ 0, G∗(x) = F (x) + ρ2‖x−x∗‖2 is (ρ+µ)-strongly
convex, where ρ+ µ ≥ 1. Thus, we have
F (x)− F (x∗) ≤ G∗(x)−G∗(x∗) ≤ ‖∇G∗(x)‖
2
2(ρ+ µ)
≤ ‖∇F (x)‖
2 + ρ2‖x− x∗‖2
ρ+ µ
.
Taking expectation on both sides, conditional on xit,h−1, we have
E
[
F (xit,h)− F (x∗)
]
≤ F (xit,h−1)− F (x∗)−
γ
2
∥∥∇F (xit,h−1)∥∥2 + γV1
≤ F (xit,h−1)− F (x∗)−
γ
2
(ρ+ µ)
[
F (xit,h−1)− F (x∗)
]
+
γρ2
2
‖xit,h−1 − x∗‖2 + γV1
≤ (1− γ
2
)
[
F (xit,h−1)− F (x∗)
]
+ γO(V1 + V2).
By telescoping and taking total expectation, we have
E
[
F (xit,Hit
)− F (x∗)
]
≤ (1− γ
2
)H
i
t
[
F (xit,0)− F (x∗)
]
+
1− (1− γ2 )H
i
t
1− (1− γ2 )
γO(V1 + V2)
≤ (1− γ
2
)Hmin
[
F (xit,0)− F (x∗)
]
+O(V1 + V2).
St ⊆ [n] is a subset of devices randomly sampled from all the n devices
without placement. Thus, we have
F
(
1
k
∑
i∈St
xit,Hit
)
≤ F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
+〈∇F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
 , 1
k
∑
i∈St
xit,Hit
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
〉
+
L
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥1k
∑
i∈St
xit,Hit
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
+ 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∇F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
L+ 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥1k
∑
i∈St
xit,Hit
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
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≤ F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
+O(V1) + (1
k
− 1
n
)
1
n− 1
∑
i∈[n]
L+ 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥xit,Hit − 1n
∑
j∈[n]
xj
t,Hjt
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
+O(V1) + (1
k
− 1
n
)
O(V2).
On the server, after aggregation, conditional on xt−1, we have
E [F (x′t)− F (x∗)]
≤ E
G∗( 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
)− F (x∗)
+ E
F (1
k
∑
i∈St
xit,Hit
)
− F
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit

≤ E
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
G∗(xit,Hit )− F (x∗)
+O(V1) + (1
k
− 1
n
)
O(V2)
≤ E
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
F (xit,Hit
)− F (x∗)
+O(V1 + (1 + 1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
≤ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(1− γ
2
)Hmin
[
F (xit,0)− F (x∗)
]
+O
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
≤ (1− γ
2
)Hmin [F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] +O
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
.
We define Gt−1(x) = F (x) + ρ2‖x− xt−1‖2, which is convex. Then, we have
E [F (xt)− F (x∗)]
≤ E [Gt−1(xt)− F (x∗)]
≤ E [(1− α)Gt−1(xt−1) + αGt−1(x′t)− F (x∗)]
≤ (1− α) [F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] + αE
[
F (x′t)− F (x∗) +
ρ
2
‖x′t − xt−1‖2
]
≤ (1− α) [F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] + α(1− γ
2
)Hmin [F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] + αO(V1 + V2)
≤
[
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
]
[F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] + αO
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
.
After T epochs, by telescoping and taking total expectation, we have
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)]
≤
[
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
]T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T]
O
(
V1 +
(
1 +
1
k
− 1
n
)
V2
)
.
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Theorem 2. Assume that additional to the n normal workers, there are q
workers training on poisoned data, where q  n, and 2q ≤ 2b < k. We take
γ ≤ min ( 1L , 2). After T epochs, Algorithm 1 with Option II converges to a global
optimum:
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)] ≤
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
(
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
)T]
[O(βV2) +O(V1)] ,
where V2 = maxt∈{0,T−1},h∈{0,Hit−1},i∈[n] ‖xit,h−x∗‖2, β = 1+ 1k−q− 1n+
k(k+b)
(k−b−q)2 .
Proof. First, we analyze the robustness of trimmed mean. Assume that among
the scalar sequence {v˜i : i ∈ [k]}, q1 elements are poisoned. Without loss of
generality, we denote the remaining correct values as {v1, . . . , vk−q1}. Thus, for
q1 < b ≤ dk/2e − 1, v(b−q1+i):(k−q1) ≤ v˜(b+i):k ≤ v(b+i):(k−q1), for ∀i ∈ [k − 2b],
where v˜(b+i):k is the (b+ i)th smallest element in {v˜i : i ∈ [k]}, and v(b+i):(k−q1)
is the (b+ i)th smallest element in {v1, . . . , vk−q1}.
Define v¯ = 1k−q1
∑
i∈[k−q1] vi. We have
k−q1−b∑
i=b−q1+1
(vi:(k−q1) − v¯) ≤
k−b∑
i=b+1
(v˜i:k − v¯) ≤
k−b∑
i=b+1
(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
⇒
∑k−q1−b
i=1 (vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1 ≤
∑k−b
i=b+1(v˜i:k − v¯)
k − 2b ≤
∑k−q1
i=b+1(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
⇒
[∑k−b
i=b+1(v˜i:k − v¯)
k − 2b
]2
≤ max

[∑k−q1−b
i=1 (vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
,
[∑k−q1
i=b+1(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2 .
Thus, we have
[Trmeanb({v˜i : i ∈ [k]})− v¯]2
=
[∑k−b
i=b+1 v˜i:k
k − 2b − v¯
]2
≤ max

[∑k−q1−b
i=1 (vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
,
[∑k−q1
i=b+1(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2 .
Note that for arbitrary subset S ⊆ [k − q1] with cardinality |S| = k − b− q1, we
have the following bound:[∑
i∈S(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
=
[∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)−
∑
i/∈S(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
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≤ 2
[∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
+ 2
[∑
i/∈S(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − b− q1
]2
=
2(k − q1)2
(k − b− q1)2
[∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − q1
]2
+
2b2
(k − b− q1)2
[∑
i/∈S(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
b
]2
≤ 2(k − q1)
2
(k − b− q1)2
[∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − q1
]2
+
2b2
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i/∈S(vi:(k−q1) − v¯)2
b
≤ 2(k − q1)
2
(k − b− q1)2
[∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)
k − q1
]2
+
2b2
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)2
b
≤ 2(k − q1)
2
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)2
k − q1 +
2b2
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)2
b
≤ 2(k − q1)(k + b− q1)
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i∈[k−q1](vi:(k−q1) − v¯)2
k − q1 .
In the worker set St, there are q1 poisoned workers. We denote Ct ⊆ St as
the set of normal workers with cardinality |Ct| = k − q1.
Thus, we have∥∥∥∥∥Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})− 1k − q1 ∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 2(k − q1)(k + b− q1)
(k − b− q1)2
∑
i∈Ct
∥∥∥xit,Hit − 1k−q1 ∑i∈Ct xit,Hit∥∥∥2
k − q1
≤ (k − q1)(k + b− q1)
(k − b− q1)2 O(V2).
Using L-smoothness, we have
F
(
Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})
)
≤ F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
+
〈
∇F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
, Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})−
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
〉
+
L
2
∥∥∥∥∥Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})− 1k − q1 ∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
+ 2
∥∥∥∥∥∇F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
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+
(
L
2
+ 2
)∥∥∥∥∥Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})− 1k − q1 ∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2O(V2) +O(V1).
Combining with Theorem 1, on the server, after aggregation using trimmed
mean, conditional on xt−1, we have
E [F (x′t)− F (x∗)]
= E
[
F
(
Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})
)
− F (x∗)
]
= E
[
F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
+ F
(
Trmeanb({xit,Hit : i ∈ St})
)
− F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
− F (x∗)
]
≤ E
[
F
(
1
k − q1
∑
i∈Ct
xit,Hit
)
− F (x∗)
]
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2O(V2) +O(V1)
≤ E
G∗
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xit,Hit
− F (x∗)
+ (1 + 1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1)
≤ E
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
G∗(xit,Hit )− F (x∗)
+ (1 + 1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1)
≤ E
 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
F (xit,Hit
)− F (x∗)
+ (1 + 1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1)
≤ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
(1− γ
2
)Hmin
[
F (xit,0)− F (x∗)
]
+
(
1 +
1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1)
≤ (1− γ
2
)Hmin [F (xt−1)− F (x∗)] +
(
1 +
1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1).
After T epochs, by telescoping and taking total expectation, we have
E [F (xT )− F (x∗)]
≤
[
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
]T
[F (x0)− F (x∗)]
+
[
1−
[
1− α+ α(1− γ
2
)Hmin
]T] [(
1 +
1
k − q −
1
n
+
k(k + b)
(k − b− q)2
)
O(V2) +O(V1)
]
.
